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Chapter Six 
Museums, Ethics and Truth: Why Museums’ Collecting Policies Must 
Face up to the Problem of Testimony 
 
Philip Tonner 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that any museum’s collecting policy must face up to the problem of 
vulnerability. Taking as a starting point an item in the collections of the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, I argue that the basic responsibility of museums to 
collect ‘things’, and to communicate information about them in a truthful way brings 
their collecting practice into the epistemological domain of testimony and into the 
normative domain of ethics. Museums are public spaces of memory, testimony, 
representation and interpretation that at once enable humanity to hold to account 
those who transgress while at the same time holding to account those who witness 
these transgressions. By virtue of this, museums can be considered spaces of ethics 
wherein testimonial and hermeneutic injustice can be confronted and challenged.  
 
 
1. An Artefact of Atrocity?  
 
The starting point for my discussion is the claim that a central normative concern of 
any museum’s collecting policy must be a certain confrontation with the 
epistemological problem of vulnerability; which, in the context discussed here, is the 
‘problem’ surrounding the conditions when an institutional body, like a museum, 
bestows authority on a ‘speaker’, be that an individual or an object. The basic 
responsibility of museums to collect ‘things’ and to communicate in a truthful way 
about them brings their practice into the epistemological domain of testimony and 
into the normative domain of ethics. While I will not suggest here a full-blown ‘ethics 
of testimony’ I would like to make this connection between testimony and collecting 
explicit. I would like to do so by way of a discussion of a seemingly insignificant item 
of every day material culture the like of which you might very well come across in a 
gallery, in a museum, somewhere around the world. It is a plain gold wedding ring. 
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The ring I’m thinking of belonged to a survivor of the Holocaust. It was donated to 
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum by Flora and Louis Pearl in 2006. 
 
Louis Pearl met Flora Stark in the SS kitchen of the Kaufering concentration camp in 
1944. The smaller camp at Kaufering was a subsidiary of the more well-known 
Dachau camp in Bavaria, Germany. Getting to know each other via smuggled letters, 
Louis would later, in 1945, barter for two gold rings that had been secretly brought 
into the camp by prisoners arriving from the liquidated Lodz Ghetto. Flora’s ring was 
confiscated following a failed attempt to get it to her in the women’s camp but Louis 
managed to keep hold of his. In 1945 the women’s camp at Kaufering was expunged 
and the inmates were sent on a Death March. Despite this, Flora survived and upon 
being liberated Louis and Flora were re-united. Louis proposed: they were married in 
Prague on the 4th November 1945.  
 
Now in the collections of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, 
Louis’s wedding ring shares many of the features of other objects that comprise 
collections (particularly of social history) around the world: it is an object of 
bestowed significance.1 We might think of this bestowing of significance in terms of a 
process of sedimentation. Anthropologist David Miller describes the process like this: 
people lay their possessions ‘down as foundations, material walls mortared with 
memory’.2 These objects then become ‘strong supports that come into their own 
when times are difficult’, and when ‘the people who laid them down face experiences 
of loss’.3 Ultimately, people, having ‘banked their possessions in the vaults of internal 
memory and external possession [,]…cash them in at times of need.’4 At such times 
the significance bestowed upon the object comes back, it repeats its supporting 
function, for the sake of the individual’s future. 
                                                          
1 Susan Pearce makes the point that objects like this populate social history collections but 
also collections of applied art and ethnography. See S. Pearce, ‘Objects as meaning; or 
narrating the past’, in S. Pearce (ed), Interpreting Objects and Collections (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1994), 20. 
2 D. Millar, The Comfort of Things (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity, 2008), 91. 
3 Ibid., 91. 
4 Ibid., 91.  
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Undoubtedly, as a wedding ring, many of the narrative connections of significance 
that surround this object are particular to the story of Louis and Flora. They are 
personal and they might very well bestow the ring with the ‘value and emotional 
tone…[of a]…souvenir: [something that is] nostalgic, backward-looking and bitter 
sweet’.5 The function of the souvenir is ‘to remember’, to provide a memorial return 
of sedimented significance, and souvenirs can lend authenticity to a particular past 
as markers, evidencing a particular set of experiences, in this case Louis and Flora’s, 
which we would never have heard of were it not for their gift to the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum.6 In addition to the reference to the particular 
narrative of Louis and Flora, Louis’s ring is of course also a tangible aspect of the 
cultural heritage of a group being implicated in the wider story of victims of the 
Holocaust.7 This ring is a token of a very intimate personal event, but it has taken on 
a wider significance. We could go so far as to say that it represents a ‘minor’ narrative 
within the ‘major’ narrative of European culture together with the events of the 
Second World War. Minority and majority status are not determined by the numbers 
of individuals countable in a group. Instead, being ‘minoritarian’ or ‘majoritarian’ is 
something that is reciprocally determined by virtue of the position of any group 
within a set of power relationships. Minorities are determined by an asymmetrical 
                                                          
5 Pearce, ‘Objects as meaning; or narrating the past’, op. cit., 20.  
6 Susan Stewart argues that souvenirs function by ‘lending authenticity’ to the past. 
Collections, by contrast, are loaned authenticity by the past itself. In fact, collections are 
ahistoric and self-enclosed precisely because they have replaced history with a form of 
classification beyond the temporal. If there is a time to be reckoned with in a collection then 
it is temporal simultaneity. See S. Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the 
Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993), 
151. 
7 According to UNESCO, tangible cultural heritage includes artefacts such as Louis’s ring but 
also monuments and historically significant places that are deemed valuable enough to 
preserve for the sake of future generations. 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/cairo/culture/tangible-cultural-heritage/ last accessed: 
2.9.13. 
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power relation to the majority.8 The minor narrative surrounding Louis’s ring has the 
capacity to challenge assumptions surrounding marriage, masculinity and ethnicity 
dominant in Europe in the mid-twentieth century. Louis was, after all, at once suitor, 
prisoner and Jew. 
 
For Louis the public availability of his wedding ring in the collection of the Holocaust 
Memorial Museum might serve to ‘validate’ his and Flora’s description of the 
Concentration Camp, a narrative that would no doubt be multifaceted. Louis’s 
wedding ring might, as Pearce has put it, ‘bear out the truth of [his testimony while 
helping him to convey] the particular moments which he wished to recall’.9 Perhaps 
Louis was the first person to cherish this object and perhaps the ring connotes a time 
when ‘life seemed…more meaningful’ to him:10 a time when all his decisions carried 
with them the possibility of devastating consequences. Yet any nostalgic or 
sentimental effect that the ring might have is at once disarticulated or 
‘deterritorialized’11 by virtue of its other connections both in the museum and 
                                                          
8 The terminology of ‘majoritarian’ and ‘minoritarian’ was developed by Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari. According to Deleuze and Guattari, unlike ‘major writers’ who seek the 
development of an expressive authorial voice, ‘minor writers’ are self-effacing: their aim is to 
give voice to the minorities who are determined by virtue of their reduced position of power 
in relation to a more powerful majority. Kafka was a minor writer because he created an 
alien ‘minor’ voice within the ‘major’ German language that it was necessary to write in even 
while it remained detached from the indigenous Czech Jewish population. See G. Deleuze 
and F. Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. D. Polan (Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 16. For a discussion see Ronald Bogue, ‘The 
Minor’, in C. J. Stivale (ed), Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts (Bucks: Acumen, 2005), 110–120.  
9 Pearce, ‘Objects as meaning; or narrating the past’, op. cit., 20. Pearce is drawing on 
Stewart, On Longing, op. cit. in this regard. 
10 Pearce, ‘Objects as meaning; or narrating the past’, op. cit., 20.  
11 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, op. cit., 86. Deleuze and Guattari depict the notion of 
deterritorialization as follows: ‘But we must declare…that an assemblage has points of 
deterritorialization; or that it always has a line of escape by which it escapes itself and makes 
its enunciations or its expressions take flight and disarticulate…’. Ibid., 86.. In Deleuze and 
Guattari’s social ontology an ‘assemblage’ (agencement) denotes the primary formation 
within social reality. (See R. Due, Deleuze (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 132.) An assemblage is 
a collection of different elements. J. Macgregor Wise draws on an archaeological example in 
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beyond. Nevertheless, it is within the context of a museum that we encounter this 
ring. Museums do many things. Here we emphasise two of their possible functions: 
museums are, at once, a place of testimony and a place of memory (lieux de 
mémoire).12 And while the notion of ‘memory’ brings together a range of cognitive 
abilities or capacities by which information is retained and reconstructed, often, 
memory is put to work (psychologically and socially) for pragmatic reasons in the 
present.13 As testimony machines, museums are agents of this ‘memorial 
pragmatism’ and for this reason, in one way or another, they affect all of our lives.14 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
order to describe this notion (archaeology being the discipline where the notion of 
assemblage is perhaps deployed most and where it functions to denote a collection of 
artefacts considered as an analytical unit). The remains of everyday life (cutlery, tools, 
animal and human remains, portable art. etc.) discovered in a particular site together with 
their relations express a particular character, ‘Romanness’, for example. The assemblage 
‘Romanness’ includes qualities (refined, small, large) and affects/effects: that is, 
assembleges, for Deleuze and Guattari, function in particular ways, in our example the 
assemblage might affect or revise our notion of what it meant to be a cultural group within 
the Classical World. Assemblages are selective and create ‘territories’ (my office, their hotel, 
his car). Territories are not fixed: the notions of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation 
refer to the events when territories are made and disarticulated. For a discussion see J. 
Macgregor Wise, ‘Assemblage’, in Stivale (ed), Gilles Deleuze, op cit., 77–87.  
12 S. A. Crane, ‘Memory, Distortion and History in the Museum’, in B. M. Carbonell (ed), 
Museum Studies: An Anthology of Contexts (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 319. Article first 
published 1997. 
13 John Sutton, ‘Memory’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed), 1. URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/memory/>. Last accessed: 19.9.2013 
14 Thinking of museums as machines allows us to approach them non-teleologically. 
Museums, approached mechanistically, are taken to be nothing more than their ‘connections 
and productions’. See C. Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, (London and New York: Routledge, 
2002), 55–56. Goodchild understands a machine in Deleuze and Guattari to be ‘an 
assemblage of parts that works and produces’. P. Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattari: An  
Introduction to the Politics of Desire (London: Sage, 1996), 218.      
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2. Memory, Testimony and Living after Auschwitz 
 
Memory is concerned with what we believe to be true and with what we believe to 
have happened; we remember events that are not now occurring but that did occur at 
some point in the past. Memory is not imagination or perception but it has a close 
relationship to these other faculties. Memory may be imbued with emotion and it is 
involved in extended affective states like grief or love; it is socially important in acts 
of commemoration and it is ethically significant in acts of promising and bearing 
witness. It is through memory that history affects our actions and experiences in the 
present.15 Memory is also, notoriously, prone to error. Memorial errors can be trivial 
or catastrophic and so, as memory machines, it is necessary that museums come to 
terms with memory as a process of distortion: it is their task to articulate this 
memorial process of distortion to individuals, visitors and the public in general, who 
have a personal rather than a professional interest in history.16 This problem of the 
status of memory as it impacts upon the museum is at once epistemological and 
ethical. 
 
Returning to our example of the Pearls’ gift, in one respect, Louis’s ring might be 
taken to be an example of an artefact of atrocity.17 Museums face difficult choices 
regarding whether and how such artefacts should be displayed. Should, for example, 
a museum display the shoes or hair of victims of an extermination camp? Holocaust 
Memorial Museum curators in Washington DC faced just this dilemma over the 
display of human hair: would visitors avoid the museum, or visit the museum but for 
the wrong reasons, just to see this exhibit?18 
 
The curators worked with representatives of concerned public groups in the process 
of shaping their displays and they faced the challenge of reconciling and displaying 
the memories and testimonies of survivors, together with historical interpretations of 
the events of the Holocaust itself.19 In general, there is a tendency toward 
                                                          
15 Sutton, ‘Memory’, op. cit., 1.  
16 Crane, ‘Memory, Distortion and History in the Museum’, op. cit., 332.  
17 Ibid., 330.  
18 Ibid., 330.  
19 Ibid., 329.   
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commemorating ‘suffering experienced’ rather than ‘suffering caused’ in Holocaust 
memorials, and the curators of the Holocaust Memorial Museum sought to limit the 
amount of space dedicated to evidence of the ‘suffering caused’ by its perpetrators. 
So, visitors to the museum will not find much in the way of Nazi memorabilia 
together with accounts of the Third Reich. Rather, they will find displays that seek to 
honour the victims of the Holocaust by bearing witness to their ‘suffering 
experienced’.20 
 
Coming to terms with the fact of this suffering has plagued, and continues to plague, 
every commentator on the horrors of the Holocaust. One example of a philosopher 
who attempted to do so may prove instructive here. In a lecture delivered on the 15th 
July 1965, Theodor Adorno commented that his earlier statement that ‘To write 
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’21 actually carried for him a dual signification. He 
writes: 
 
Just as I said that after Auschwitz one could not write poems – by which I 
meant to point to the hollowness of the resurrected culture of that time – it 
could equally well be said, on the other hand, that one must write 
poems…[since]…as long as there is an awareness of suffering among human 
beings there must also be art as the objective form of that awareness.22 
  
‘Auschwitz’ now has a dual significance. Here it stands as Adorno’s short-hand for 
the horror of the Holocaust as a whole, and for his part he stated that he was on the 
side of art in the antinomy that he had identified when it came to the representation 
of suffering.23 Art is essential to humanity as the objective form of the awareness of 
suffering. But ‘Auschwitz’ is also a place, a camp, that has become synonymous with 
the Holocaust. Auschwitz was built on the order of Heinrich Himmler. It was an 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 329. 
21 T. Adorno, Prisms, trans. S. Weber and S. Weber (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 1967), 34.  
22 T. Adorno, Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, edited by R. Tiedemann, trans. E. 
Jephcott (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), 110. 
23 Ibid., 110.  
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industrial complex that comprised three camps: the first, Auschwitz I, was a 
concentration camp. It was opened on the 20th May 1940. Auschwitz II-Birkenau, 
both a concentration and extermination camp, followed on the 8th October 1941 and 
Auschwitz III, the labour camp, was opened on the 31st May 1942. Something in the 
region of 50 more small camps in the surrounding area came under the same 
administration as the three main camps. In just five years 1.3 million men, women 
and children were sent to Auschwitz; 1.1 million of them were killed; 90% of them 
were Jewish.24  
 
‘Auschwitz’ and the Holocaust as a whole was new and terrible: the members of the 
International Nuremberg Tribunal were lost for words when trying to come to terms 
with it: just what was this horrendous event? What was its meaning? In the end they 
adopted Raphael Lemkin’s (1944) neologism ‘genocide’ (Greek genos, birth, genus, 
species: Latin caedere, to kill) in order to describe this atrocity, an atrocity that 
actually comprised four distinct types of crime identified by the Tribunal. These were 
crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of 
participation in planning to commit all of these crimes. The Nuremburg Trial 
concluded that the Nazi genocide was the prototype for any other such crime: it 
represented the actual and total destruction of a population that was declared 
undesirable because it ‘belonged to some species, genus or group’, and not because of 
the ideas or of the opinions of the individuals who made up that population.25 
 
For historian Elizabeth Roudinesco, Auschwitz perverted not only the raison d’état 
(national interest) but also the criminal impulse itself; there and then, criminality 
was not conducted as the result of some terrible unconstrained impulse or out of a 
perverse desire for transgression. Rather, the criminality of Auschwitz, embodied in 
the figure of Adolf Eichmann, who was in charge of the logistics of the Final Solution 
and who chillingly claimed to have lived by Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy, was 
                                                          
24 E. Roudinesco, Our Dark Side: A History of Perversion, trans. D. Macey (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2009), 90.  
25 Ibid., 94.  
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an inversion of the Law: it resulted from a ‘perverse rationalisation’ that made crime 
the norm.26  
 
In addition to the question of poetry, Adorno asked a further question, which he 
believed was necessitated by Auschwitz: ‘whether one can live after [it]?’.27 Adorno 
confides in us, his listeners and readers, that he is haunted by the recurring dream 
that he is no longer really alive but instead exists just as the ‘emanation of a wish’ of a 
victim of Auschwitz. Anyone approaching the mantle of ‘thinker’ in Adorno’s 
estimation must face up to this question. It is the question that was put so starkly by 
Sartre’s Resistance fighter who asked ‘whether or why one should live in a world in 
which one is beaten until one’s bones are smashed’.28 This is a basic philosophical 
question for Adorno since it concerns the very possibility of ‘any affirmation of life’ 
whatsoever when confronted by the realisation that, as Hannah Arendt put it, we do 
                                                          
26 Ibid., 91–94. The violence done to Kant by Eichmann might be intelligible in terms of the 
disclaimer that, regarding the order that takes the form of an (categorical) imperative, ‘it 
doesn’t matter what I think or feel about an order since, by virtue of its issue, the order must 
be carried out!’. For Roudinesco, it is the ‘imperative force of the order itself’ that is primary 
for understanding Eichmann (and others like him) rather than the specific content of the 
order itself (ibid., 91–92). It is the fact that Eichmann was an agent of an inverted Law that 
made him so ‘terrifyingly normal’. Eichmann claimed that he was just ‘following orders’ and 
went so far as to deny that he was anti-Semitic (despite reportedly having said that he would 
‘jump into [his] grave laughing’ due to his ‘extraordinary satisfaction’ at having the death of 
five million Jews on his conscience. See H. Arendt [1963], Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report 
on the Banality of Evil (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994), 460. A chilling echo of the deadly 
imperative force of an order can be heard in a report issued by the state news agency and 
published by Roman newspapers on 25th March, 1944. It reported the shooting of ten 
prisoners (who were un-connected to the event) for every German killed by a bomb attack on 
a German Police Column that was purportedly intended to sabotage Italo-German 
cooperation during the Second World War. For the thirty three German casualties three 
hundred and thirty five prisoners were killed in an abandoned quarry. The report ends with 
the simple statement that ‘This order has already been carried out’. A. Portelli, The Order 
Has Been Carried Out: History, Memory, and Meaning of a Nazi Massacre in Rome 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1. 
27 Adorno, Metaphysics, op. cit., 110. 
28 Ibid., 111.  
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not owe our existence solely to ourselves but are instead radically limited and 
insignificant, mired in the contingencies of history and the aleatoric.29 
 
In light of this we should not be surprised that any museological representation of 
the Holocaust or of any other atrocity for that matter should be at once challenging 
and problematic. Discussing the ‘demands of holocaust representation’,30 the critic 
Michael Rothberg emphasises that a central feature of Adorno’s view is that a ‘new 
categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to arrange 
their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing 
similar will happen’31 and he adds that this in fact necessitates a ‘new relationship to 
the future’ for human beings.32 This relationship is related to the problem of memory 
and is at once ethical and epistemological. It is ethical in the Kantian sense of issuing 
a categorical imperative that bears upon us regardless of our desires and it is 
epistemological in terms of the problematic of testimony and truth. It was this new 
relationship to the future that was taken up as the mission of the Holocaust 
Memorial Museum in Washington DC Its primary aim is to: 
 
advance and disseminate knowledge about this unprecedented tragedy; to 
preserve the memory of those who suffered; and to encourage its visitors to 
reflect upon the moral and spiritual questions raised by the[se] 
events…[as]…well as their own responsibilities as citizens of a democracy.33 
  
By virtue of this mission the Holocaust Memorial Museum (at least in Washington 
DC and perhaps also in other Holocaust Museums, in so far as they share this 
mission) establishes its candidacy to be ‘a’, if not ‘the’, site where this new 
                                                          
29 A. Parr, Deleuze and Memorial Culture: Desire, Singular Memory and the Politics of 
Trauma (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 2. 
30 T. Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation, 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). For a discussion see R. 
Wilson, Theodor Adorno (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 110.   
31 T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London and New York: Routledge, 
1973), 365.  
32 Rothberg, Traumatic Realism, op. cit., 32.  
33 http://www.ushmm.org/museum/mission/ last accessed 25.2.13.  
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relationship to the future ‘takes place’. By preserving the memories of those who 
suffered and by presenting these memories to its visitors the Museum aims to inspire 
in their visitors reflection on their moral and political responsibilities as these moral 
and political responsibilities are already unfolding into our shared future, perhaps 
provoking them to take an ethical stand in line with this categorical imperative that 
would foster the creation of a non-fascist kingdom of ends. This museum’s ‘present’, 
if I can put it this way, occurs by making the past present, and it is normatively 
effective in terms of how that past comes to affect our future. It is in just these terms 
that such a museum might understand the possibility of becoming an agent of a 
renewed affirmation of life, bearing witness to the past for the sake of our future.   
 
3. Material Testimony and the Epistemological Problem of Vulnerability 
 
If we are to grant this possibility, that a museum may take part in creating this new 
relationship with the future, then this should prompt a re-reading of that place where 
Adorno’s thought – and, by extension, critical theory – has done the most to shape 
the theoretical discussion that has unfolded surrounding the museum. Adorno 
shared Valéry’s worry about the ‘shock’ of the museum, a shock that brings to 
historical-philosophical insight the fact that works of art are dying by our hands. In 
the museum, Adorno says, we ‘put the art of the past to death’.34 The German word 
museal carries this association: it ‘describes objects to which the observer no longer 
has a vital relationship and which are in the process of dying’.35 Because of this, such 
objects ‘owe their preservation more to historical respect than to the needs of the 
present’.36. Yet, as we have seen, this cannot be the whole story. Reading the Adorno 
who challenges humanity to face up to the question of the possibility of a new 
affirmation of life after Auschwitz against an Adorno who sees in museums a 
‘neutralisation of culture’ and the poverty of ‘cultural traditions’, should prompt us to 
re-read his closing remarks in ‘Valéry Proust Museum’ (1955), since it is there that he 
intimates the coming of a new meaning to dead works that will affect our future. 
 
                                                          
34 Adorno, Prisms, op. cit., 177.  
35 Ibid., 175. 
36 Ibid., 175.  
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Despite the museum’s association with the death and entombment of art and 
artefacts ‘the natural history collections of the spirit have actually transformed works 
of art [and, by extension, other kinds of artefacts] into the hieroglyphics of history. 
[They have] brought [to] them a new content while the old one shrivelled up’.37 As 
hieroglyph (Greek for ‘sacred carving’), the artefact combines within itself a double 
materiality of pictograph (pictures) and phonemic (vocal sounds).38 The image of the 
museal artefact as hieroglyph of history implicates Adorno in later discussions of 
materiality that have developed an analogy between material culture and language.39 
In these terms an artefact that was produced by human hands bids a response, an 
account, to be given of it that would elucidate its meaning, its historical significance, 
what it marks out as a hieroglyph. As hieroglyph, the artefact is essentially related to 
speech: it requires a response, an account, from ‘us’ in order to be understood. Let 
me call this the artefact’s ‘material testimony’. 
 
Even though the medium of the artefact’s testimony is the speaker, the agent, the 
artefact’s ‘truth’ is ultimately independent of the truth of the speaker’s testimony (we 
can, after all, read an artefact incorrectly). In other words, just like Egyptian 
hieroglyphs, the content of an artefact’s material testimony can be (more or less) 
epistemologically inaccessible in the absence of a Rosetta Stone. Artefactual material 
testimony will always require articulation and appropriation by speakers, be they 
individuals or institutions. Adorno has opened the door to seeing in artefacts the 
possibility of their renewed appropriation in speech from which a new affirmation 
might follow. This new affirmation (that perhaps indicates a certain utopian 
optimism) would bear witness to certain artefacts as hieroglyphs of human suffering 
and would ultimately seek to deploy them (after the fashion of the Holocaust 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 185.  
38 B. M. Fagan, People of the Earth: An Introduction to World Prehistory (Upper Saddle 
River NJ: Pearson, 2010), 349.  
39 See C. Tilley, ‘Interpreting Material Culture’, in S. M. Pearce (ed), Interpreting Objects and 
Collections (London and New York: Routledge, 67–75). Tilley points out that since the 
advent of structuralism in European thought it has been possible to view material culture 
symbolically as a signifying system and to develop an account of it that draws on Saussure’s 
linguistics. 
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Museum’s mission statement) for the sake of ‘our’ future as an example of how not to 
live and of what not to accept. 
 
Granted these considerations, we might suggest that underlying a certain number of 
the gifts of artefacts to certain museums by individuals and groups is the desire that 
they become hieroglyphs of collective memory. If so, then gifts are given so that ‘we’ 
remember and attempt to make sense of a singular past whose articulation is 
prompted by the object, for the sake of our collective future; and this constitutes an 
ethical undercurrent to aspects of contemporary collecting.  Given this context it 
would make sense to say that a museum’s function is, to many collectors, benefactors 
and visitors, to act as a material custodian of our memories and as such its ethical 
burden is responsibility not only to collect, conserve and to communicate, but to do 
so truthfully.40 
 
In collections the use-value of objects is aestheticized.41 Collections reframe objects 
‘within a world of attention and manipulation of context’.42 Because of this (as 
Stewart has argued), the function of the collection is to create a new context. This 
context will stand in a metaphorical relationship to everyday life and will present the 
possibility of ‘starting again’43 with, potentially, a renewed and enhanced moral 
awareness. It is within such new contexts that any validation or otherwise of personal 
narratives will take place. Part of this new context is epistemological. Within any new 
context an epistemological connection must be established between the object and 
the speaker if the artefact is to bear any relationship with what the speaker is 
attempting to establish. In other words, the object becomes the material marker 
evidencing the individual’s (or group’s, for that matter, although this would present 
additional challenges) testimony. I suggest that there is an epistemological 
                                                          
40 S. Okita, ‘Community, country, and commonwealth: The ethical responsibility of 
museums’, in G. Edson (ed), Museum Ethics (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 139. 
Such an aspiration to truthfulness is reflected in the Museums Association’s definition of a 
museum: http://www.museumsassociation.org/about/frequently-asked-questions last 
accessed 12.09.2013. 
41 Stewart, On Longing, op. cit., 151.  
42 Ibid., 151.  
43 Ibid., 152. 
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parallelism between material and linguistic testimony such that both might be false 
or true. Material and linguistic testimony are both truth apt. 
 
Testimony is a central plank in how we come to know the world and it is a ‘crucial 
source for history’.44 David Hume put it this way: ‘there is no species of reasoning 
more common, more useful, and even more necessary to human life, than that which 
is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eyewitnesses and 
spectators’.45 But, testimony poses significant issues for philosophers and museum 
professionals alike. Testimony is a speech-act wherein a speaker ‘says’, ‘tells’ or 
‘asserts’ something.46 As an assertion, a testimony offers a proposition that is 
depicted as true. As Michael Dummett puts it, testimony, as an informative utterance 
of a sentence, ‘serves not only to express a thought, and to refer to a truth-value, but 
also to assert something, namely that the thought expressed is true, or that the truth-
value referred to is truth’.47 In cases where a speaker’s utterance is to be taken 
literally (as opposed to playfully, or fictionally, and so on) testifying that ‘X’ is or was 
the case, is equivalent to speaker ‘S’ inviting hearer ‘P’ to understand and to believe 
that ‘X’  is or was the case.48 
  
Following Adler, by taking a broadly Kantian line, we can suggest that in ordinary 
cases hearer ‘P’ has a duty of fidelity to trust speaker ‘S’ since a stance of active 
distrust or active suspicion would impose a higher standard of acceptance than 
would be ‘socially, conversationally, or epistemologically appropriate’.49 However, 
speakers are capable of deception and error, exaggeration and ambiguity and such 
                                                          
44 D. LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1998), 11.  
45 D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by E. Steinberg 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), 74.  
46 Jonathan Adler, ‘Epistemological Problems of Testimony’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/testimony-episprob/>., 2. Last 
accessed: 19.9.13.   
47 M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1973), 298.  
48 Adler, ‘Epistemological Problems of Testimony’, op. cit., 2.  
49 Ibid., 3. 
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factors generate an epistemological problem when hearers only have the word of an 
individual speaker as the source of their belief (that ‘X’). Trusting a speaker involves 
the ascription of authority to them and the epistemological problem of testimonial 
vulnerability (does the listener, in our case the institutional body of the museum, 
have good reason to bestow authority on a ‘speaker’, individual or object) enters into 
the problematic of (institutional) collecting. Given this, a central normative concern 
of any museum’s Collecting Policy must be to face up to the epistemological problem 
of vulnerability.  
 
4. Vulnerability, Collecting Policies, Display and the Assurance View 
 
It is a fundamental and basic responsibility of museums to ‘collect, conserve and 
communicate’50 in such a way that they ensure that the information gathered, 
conserved and communicated about collections – and by extension, human history – 
is ‘accurate and true within the limitations of current human knowledge’.51 But not 
only that, museums must, in the manner of their presentation, be willing to, as D. K. 
Dean puts it, ‘acknowledge the inherent fallibility of any ideas expressed due to their 
source’.52 That is, museums must not only face up to epistemological vulnerability; 
they must make explicit reference to it somewhere. One might almost imagine a sign 
bearing these words ‘Beware! Our exhibits may be lying, or at least not telling the full 
story’ hanging in galleries in museums (but also art galleries and other exhibition 
spaces) around the world. Fundamentally, museums qua institution have a (perfect) 
duty to be honest.53 After all, museum visitors trust exhibitions as a reliable source of 
truth and their expectation is that the information presented by them is accurate 
and, ultimately, ‘true’.54 In no small part exhibitions that challenge visitor’s 
expectations both with regard to the information on display and with regard to a 
                                                          
50 Okita, ‘Community, country, and commonwealth’, op. cit., 139. 
51 D. K. Dean, ‘Ethics and museum exhibitions’, in G. Edson (ed), Museum Ethics (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1997), 218.  
52 Ibid., 218. Italics: my emphasis.  
53 Ibid., 218.  
54 Ibid., 218. 
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museum’s claim to be an authoritative source of truth are the cause of much public 
frustration over modern minimalist exhibition and display approaches.55 
 
A museum is a site where subjectivities and objectivities collide.56 It is a space of 
memory and testimony but it is also a space of representation and interpretation. 
Indeed, interpretation is an expression of what museums ‘do’: a museum is a space of 
(the generation of and mutual influence and conflict of) plural views and self-
reflection.57 Experience in museums is not ordinary experience: it is experience that 
might contest representation and truth. This disruption of the ordinary is, no doubt, 
a source of frustration for some visitors.58 As Beth Lord suggests, the lack of 
substantial, or, indeed, of any, explanatory panels in some modern galleries is due to 
a contestation of the value of (institutional or authoritative) interpretation by the 
museum itself: minimal interpretation reflects the museum’s self-awareness as both 
a postmodern space of pluralism and self-reflection, as well as an Enlightenment 
space that contests the interpretation of things in terms of the very adequacy of 
conceptual schemes to the objects that they are intended to ‘fit’.59 What is at stake in 
much of the discussion surrounding modern museums, especially those that 
challenge visitors’ expectations by asking them to consider how knowledge is 
constructed while at the same time offering only minimal interpretation to guide 
visitors, is the very status and trustworthiness of the ‘museum as a memory 
institution’ or memory machine. 60 Epistemology and ethics overlap. Together, any 
attempt to confront epistemological vulnerability, combined with a challenge to 
interpret an object or display (perhaps only minimally by the institution), not only 
highlights the overlap of epistemology and ethics within the institutional context of 
the museum it does so in a potentially explosive manner.  
 
                                                          
55 Crane, ‘Memory, Distortion and History in the Museum’, op. cit., 319. See also B. Lord, 
‘Philosophy and the museum: An introduction to the special issue’, Museum Management 
and Curatorship 21 (2006), 79–87. 
56 Crane, ‘Memory, Distortion and History in the Museum’, op. cit., 319. 
57 B. Lord, ‘Philosophy and the museum’, op. cit, 83. 
58 Ibid., 80.  
59 Ibid., 83.  
60 Crane, ‘Memory, Distortion and History in the Museum’, op. cit., 319.  
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The museum may opt for a version of the ‘Assurance View’ of testimony: this might 
be an appealing way to deal with Dean’s imperative that museums note the fallibility 
of any exhibit due to their source, since on this view it is the speaker that ‘constitutes 
[their] utterance as a reason for belief’.61 In such a case the museum’s trust in the 
speaker and their communication of their story is based on their acceptance of the 
speaker’s invitation to them to trust him or her. The speaker stands behind their 
word and asks the hearer to believe them. This performative dimension to the 
assurance view is significant since trusting someone on this view of testimony 
amounts to ‘rely[ing] on [an individual’s] assurance, [while] not…assum[ing] 
responsibility for the truth of’ their assertion oneself.62  
 
Trust, on the assurance view, amounts to dismissing (within limits) counter-evidence 
to a speaker’s claim.63 In spite of this, adopting a version of this view of testimony 
should not serve as a ‘get-out clause’ for museums when it comes to the veracity of 
their records and displays. Instead, it should be taken as a basis for museums to face 
up to their responsibility to inform visitors about testimonial and interpretive 
fallibility or, in other words, to erect their ‘beware signs’. Given this, adoption of the 
assurance view becomes the vehicle for stating the epistemological problem of 
testimony and memory within the context of modern museums. 
 
Further to this, a museum as an institution might also become a public sphere of 
ethics since, operating on the basis of a Kantian ‘good will’, any museum could 
provide a public space for witnesses to historical events of injustice to counteract any 
forces that would seek to neutralise their individual or group testimony.64 For this 
                                                          
61 Adler, ‘Epistemological Problems of Testimony’, op. cit., 26.  
62 See C. R. Green, ‘Epistemology of Testimony’, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/#SSH2c.v , 2008. 
63 Adler, ‘Epistemological Problems of Testimony’, op. cit., 26. 
64 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) Kant describes the good will as 
being the only unqualified good. For Kant, a good will is ‘not good because of what it effects 
or accomplishes…but only because of its volition…it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, 
is to be valued’. I. Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. M. J. Gregor and A. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:394/50. It may prove salutary for the ethical museal 
imagination that, even if the museum fails in its self-appointed ethical aims, after Kant, we 
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reason an important ethical function for museums, within their adoption of an 
assurance view of testimony, could be to address problems associated with 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. For Miranda Fricker, testimonial injustice 
occurs when ‘prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a 
speaker’s word’ while hermeneutic injustice occurs at a more basic level ‘when a gap 
in collective interpretative resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it 
comes to making sense of their social experiences’.65 By providing a space to let a 
diverse series of testimonies be heard, museum space could challenge and seek 
redress at both these levels of injustice. On the level of testimonial injustice any 
deflated level of credibility ascribed to a speaker’s word could be held up for 
collective scrutiny in terms of the material evidence while, at the level of hermeneutic 
injustice, collections and displays could problematise the lack of collective 
interpretative resources needed to make sense of the social experiences of a group.  
 
5. Holocaust Museums and the ‘Real Order’ of Nazism 
 
Given this, Holocaust Museums prove to be a case in point, as they constitute by 
their establishment the first step of a possible hermeneutic redress. It has been 
suggested that the goal of Nazism was to totally destroy the Jews, to eliminate them 
from ‘memory itself’.66 Roudinesco has suggested that the real order of the Holocaust 
was actually ‘Kill the Jew and then kill anyone who witnessed the murder’.67 This is 
compatible with the perverse aspiration of the Nazis that the Jewish Museum in 
Prague should serve as a ‘museum to an extinct race’. Extinction is, after all, not 
murder and erecting a monument to an extinct race would dissolve any guilt 
associated with the demise of the race in question: such a museum could maintain a 
perverse aspiration to natural history. It is chilling to note that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
might position ethical appraisal to evaluate the founding volition for the museum and not on 
its ultimate successes.        
65 M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 1.  
66 D. LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), 64.  
67 Roudinesco, Our Dark Side, op. cit., 97.  
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Sonderkommandos, the Jewish prisoners who were forced to empty the Gas 
Chambers, were to share the same fate as the victims whose remains they were 
tasked with disposing: they too were to be silenced. There were to be no witnesses to 
hold the perpetrators of the Holocaust to account. There was to be no hope of redress 
at either the testimonial or hermeneutic levels. The value and power of the witness’s 
testimony is as the assurance view has established. Its power resides in the ability of 
a witness to performatively constitute an utterance as a reason for belief. Witnesses 
to a crime do so by standing beside what they say and by letting their gaze be cast 
over the figure of the accused, be this an individual or humanity itself. 
 
Setting the stage for subsequent Holocaust Deniers, all of the Nazis involved in the 
genocide disavowed their participation in the acts that they were charged with 
committing.68 This fact is well known. The paranoia and neurosis associated with the 
desire to keep the truth hidden from view by those still at liberty after the war is well 
represented by the character Klaus in Cavani’s (1974) The Night Porter (il portiere di 
note). Klaus is one of the leading members of a fictitious Nazi psychoanalytical group 
whose members are attempting to cure themselves of their guilt complexes. He says: 
‘Even if it says a thousand [names] on paper, ten thousand, it still makes less 
impression than one witness, in flesh and blood, staring at you. That is why they are 
so dangerous, Max.’69 
  
The witness’s testimony and the hope of redress, at once pressing and poignant, are 
more powerful than the ‘objective’ inanimate evidence (the names on a page) because 
of the constitutive act of declaring a testimony to be true: ‘you may deny that you 
were there, that you did what you did, but I saw you do it!’. This is the force of 
witness testimony and as a public space that confronts the effects of trauma, that is, 
of suffering experienced, a museum may provide a public forum for testimony and its 
collections may validate such claims.70   
                                                          
68 Ibid., 97.  
69 The Night Porter (1974), directed by Liliana Cavani. USA: Anchor Bay, 44:03. See also, G. 
Marrone, The Gaze and the Labyrinth: The Cinema of Liliana Cavani (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
70 This applies not just to Holocaust museums since other museums might have displays 
dealing with other atrocities. Sadly, museums have plenty of examples to choose from. In 
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6. Concluding Remarks  
 
The evidence of suffering experienced that is displayed in museums implores us to 
face up to Adorno’s questions: how are you going to live with this knowledge? and 
what are you going to do about it? From this museal gaze there is nowhere to hide. If 
denial of their murderous acts amounted to a further act of violence toward the 
victims of the Holocaust by its perpetrators then the establishment of a Holocaust 
Museum, as a public act of memory, constitutes an important act of contemporary 
resistance.71 The museum, as a public space of memory, testimony, representation 
and interpretation at once enables humanity to hold to account those charged with 
transgression while at the same time holding to account those who witness these 
transgressions: both the victims and the bystanders. The museum is the materialised 
gaze of humanity turned upon itself: it is at once a space of ethics and truth. 
Museums are places where society might attempt to begin to redress past testimonial 
and hermeneutic injustices by bearing witness to the material testimony of the 
artefacts of atrocity associated with these acts, the Gas Chambers themselves, the 
remains of the victims that have been discovered and even Louis Pearl’s wedding 
ring. Through this, these lost testimonies can be intimated in the present. 72 
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other words, it is not necessary that the entire museum be given over to trauma or injustice 
(as with Holocaust museums) in order to perform this function.  
71 LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust, op. cit., 68. LaCapra explores the notion of a public 
act of memory constituting an act of resistance. 
72 I would like to thank Claire Singerman (of Gathering The Voices [gatheringthevoices.com], 
a digitisation project gathering oral testimony of Holocaust survivors who sought sanctuary 
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Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being (Continuum 2010) and of a 
number of papers in the theoretical humanities.  
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